

Exhibit C


CERTIFICATION OF KELLIE M. HARDIMAN

I, Kellie M. Hardiman, state:

1. I am the Deputy Assistant Director responsible for the Criminal Intelligence Branch within the Criminal Investigative Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). I have served in my position since December 2024, and I have been employed by the FBI as an intelligence analyst since September 2003. I am responsible for, among other things, oversight of the production of intelligence analysis related to criminal threats.
2. Attached to this certification is a true and correct copy of an FBI Intelligence Assessment titled "Venezuelan Government Officials Use Tren de Aragua to Undermine Public Safety," dated January 28, 2025.

I declare under penalty of perjury that the forgoing is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

May 16, 2025



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Venezuelan Government Officials Use Tren de Aragua to Undermine Public Safety

Key Takeaways

The FBI assesses some Venezuelan Government officials likely facilitate the migration of Tren de Aragua (TdA) members from Venezuela to the United States to advance the Maduro regime's objective of undermining public safety in the United States, demanding additional law enforcement (LE) resources and focus.

The FBI assesses some Venezuelan Government officials likely use TdA members as proxies for the Maduro regime in an effort to destabilize Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and the United States, demonstrating Maduro's willingness to violate the territorial sovereignty of Venezuela's neighbors to advance the regime's policies.

Looking Forward

The FBI assesses, in the next 6 to 18 months, Venezuelan Government officials likely will attempt to leverage TdA members in the United States as proxy actors to threaten, abduct, and kill members of the Venezuelan diaspora in the United States who are vocal Maduro critics and expand similar activities throughout South America. The implications would be a loss of confidence by the fleeing dissidents in the United States and foreign LE providing safety to them.

Opportunities

Opportunities to counteract TdA presence and expansion in the United States include increasing awareness of and educating state and local LE on known activities and methods of the criminal organization. Intelligence and LE agencies could collaborate on developing and focusing intelligence collection requirements. FBI Legats in North, Central, and South America, and the Caribbean have built robust LE partnerships in the region, which provide the opportunity to gain a holistic understanding of the TdA threat and identify changes or trends in how the group operates.

Venezuelan Government Officials Amplify the Expansion of TdA Criminal Actors into the United States

The FBI assesses some Venezuelan Government officials likely facilitate the migration of TdA^a members from Venezuela to the United States to advance the Maduro regime's objective of undermining public safety in the United States. This assessment is based on reported efforts by the Maduro regime to manage and finance TdA to create social problems in the United States and its release of violent TdA members from Venezuelan prisons.

- As of November 2023, the Venezuelan Government had strategically managed and financed TdA as part of Venezuela's larger foreign policy goal of creating internal security and social problems for the United States. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro viewed the border chaos and widespread problems in New York City, New York, and Chicago, Illinois, among other places, as his successful use of TdA to create political, social, and security issues for the USG, which he used as leverage in sanctions negotiations with the United States.^b High-ranking Venezuelan officials were not involved in TdA's daily activities. Strategic decision-making regarding Venezuelan Government use of TdA went through Maduro, who used confidants as go-betweens to insulate himself from public affiliation with TdA, according to a human source with indirect access.¹
- As of late February 2024, Maria Iris Varela Rangel, who oversaw the correctional and penal institutions in Venezuela, was deliberately releasing members of TdA from the prison systems. The newly released TdA members were encouraged to flee Venezuela, travel to the United States, and often received transportation assistance, according to a human source, much of whose reporting has been corroborated over the last three years.²

Venezuelan Government Officials Use TdA as Proxy Actors in South America and the United States

The FBI assesses some Venezuelan Government officials likely use TdA members as proxies for the Maduro regime in an effort to destabilize Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Colombia, and the United States. This assessment is based on efforts by senior Venezuelan Government officials to plan lethal operations using TdA actors in neighboring regional countries and increase the number of violent TdA actors for use as potential proxies in the United States.

- As of February 2023, two Cuban men in military uniforms of an unspecified country and an unidentified number of Syrian men were in Caracas, Venezuela, working for Venezuelan Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, according to a contact who claimed

^a As of July 2024, TdA was Venezuela's most powerful homegrown criminal organization and the only Venezuelan gang that had successfully operated outside Venezuela. TdA grew from a prison gang isolated in the Venezuelan state of Aragua to a transnational threat with a diverse and violent criminal portfolio. Source: Website | InSight Crime | "Tren de Aragua" | 3 July 2024 | www.insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/tren-de-aragua/ | accessed on 11 July 2024 | InSight Crime is a non-profit think tank and media organization with offices in Washington, DC, and Medellín, Colombia, specializing in investigating organized crime in Latin America and the Caribbean.

^b See Appendix A: Diplomatic Efforts of the Maduro Regime Tied to Migration and Sanctions Relief.

direct access and who spoke in confidence. The Syrian men possessed plans describing the use of TdA as a proxy force to disable the Governments of Chile, Peru, and the United States. According to the Syrians, as recounted by the contact, the first phase of the plan had been in action for two years as of February 2023; it called for the release of TdA leaders from prison and the relocation of their family members to the United States.³

- As of August 2023, Venezuelan National Assembly member Diosdado Cabello was working with members of TdA and Mexico-based Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG) to plan, train, direct, and conduct violent attacks in South America, specifically in Chile and Ecuador. The plan targeting Ecuador included attacks on two unnamed Ecuadorian congressional members. The intended targets in Chile were unknown, but the operatives who were to conduct the attacks were of Colombian and Venezuelan ethnicity, according to a contact who spoke in confidence.⁴

Perspective

Since 2001, with the inception of Bolivarian Circles^c under former President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela has experienced a rise in government-supported state and local level criminal groups, such as *colectivos*^d; *megabandas*,^e such as TdA; ideologically aligned paramilitary organizations^f; and Peace Defender Squads.^g The Maduro regime has embraced and expanded the use of these groups to achieve internal and external objectives under the banner of protecting the Bolivarian Revolution. As of September 2023, Venezuelan national and local government authorities have ceded ever-greater control over their AORs, allowing criminal groups to act as de facto public safety authorities.⁵ As a result, a Venezuelan hybrid criminal state has emerged, blurring the lines between government and criminal actors. The Venezuelan Government uses these alliances to consolidate power from the top down, targeting and intimidating political opponents and dissidents in Venezuela while abdicating responsibility for the resulting violence and chaos.^{6, 7}

^c Bolivarian Circles were created by Chavez in 2001 as a new generation of political groups to provide grass-roots political support. Source: Investigative Report | Insight Crime | “The Devolution of State Power: The ‘Colectivos’” | 18 May 2018 | <https://insightcrime.org/investigations/devolution-state-power-colectivos/> | accessed on 7 May 2024.

^d *Colectivos* emerged in the 2000s as a disparate network of grassroots political groups that were trained, financed, and armed by the state. Source: Investigative report | Insight Crime | “Maduro’s Peace Defender Squads Are Anything But Peaceful” | 12 July 2023 | <https://insightcrime.org/investigations/maduro-peace-defender-squads-anything-peaceful/> | accessed on 8 May 2024.

^e Megabandas, aka trenes, are criminal structures dedicated to criminal activities like killings, drug trafficking, and extortion. TdA falls under the *megabandas* banner. Source: Report | European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) | “Venezuela – Country Focus” | November 2023 | <https://europa.eu/publications/venezuela-country-focus> | accessed on 24 April 2024 | EUAA is an agency created by European Union regulation 439/210 to increase cooperation among member states on asylum.

^f Analyst Note: “Ideologically aligned paramilitary organizations” refers to groups like the ELN.

^g Cuadrillas Defensoras de la Paz (CUPAZ), or Peace Defender Squads, were created in March 2019 by Maduro as volunteer civilian groups meant to bring peace to Venezuelan neighborhoods. The CUPAZ, however, have been used to target political opposition and are involved in criminal activities exploiting local communities. Source: Report | Insight Crime | “Maduro’s Peace Defender Squads Are Anything But Peaceful” | 12 July 2023 | <https://insightcrime.org/investigations/maduro-peace-defender-squads-anything-peaceful/> | accessed on 8 May 2024.

The Venezuelan Government faced accusations it uses groups, like the National Liberation Army (ELN) and TdA, to intimidate, kidnap, and kill dissidents and political opponents sheltering in neighboring countries, such as Colombia and Chile, after they have fled social, political, and economic dysfunction in Venezuela.^h The Venezuelan Government has publicly countered these accusations by accusing dissidents, including an unknown number of former Venezuelan military members, of plotting to overthrow the Maduro regime. For example, in February 2024, a group, which included at least four TdA members, abducted and killed a former Venezuelan Army lieutenant and outspoken Maduro critic, who was living in asylum in Chile. In January 2024, the Venezuelan Government publicly accused the victim of participating in a conspiracy to overthrow the regime and kill Maduro. In May 2024, the Chilean prosecutor leading the investigation indicated that investigators had ruled out the victim's involvement in criminal activities and that Chile suspected the killing had been directed from Venezuela. In response, the Venezuelan Government called the victim's killing a false-flag operation carried out by Chilean and foreign intelligence agents to blame Venezuela.^{8, 9, 10, 11}

Outlook

The FBI assesses, in the next 6 to 18 months, some Venezuelan Government officials likely will attempt to leverage TdA members in the United States as proxy actors to threaten, abduct, and kill members of the US-based Venezuelan diaspora who are vocal Maduro critics.ⁱ Indicators that this is occurring mirror Venezuela's alleged transnational repression efforts in South America, with tactics that include harassment, abductions, cross-border renditions, and targeted killings. The FBI also assesses Venezuelan Government officials likely will increase actions to target Maduro regime critics and pro-Venezuela democracy advocates throughout South American countries, leveraging TdA members when convenient, thereby leading to further destabilization in the region. Indicators this is occurring include open source or foreign partner reporting of violent incidences involving high-profile dissidents or intelligence reporting of planned attacks on regime critics using TdA members.

Implications

As TdA expands its presence in the United States, the Venezuelan diaspora may become targets of opportunity to further silence critics of the Maduro regime, increasing violence and resulting in a loss of confidence in the USG's ability to protect free speech and those granted asylum or temporary residency, posing a challenge to US LE. Venezuela's use of violent proxy actors inside the United States to repress pro-democracy, anti-Maduro activists would increase violence in US communities where migrants have settled and present challenges for US LE to detect and counter the activity. As TdA further expands activities throughout South America, its expansion would undermine the confidence of dissidents fleeing to perceived safe haven countries.

^h See Appendix B: Venezuelan Migration Trends.

ⁱ See Appendix B: Venezuelan Migration Trends.

Analytic Tradecraft Summary

Confidence Level

(U) The FBI has medium confidence in the assessments within this intelligence assessment. The intelligence cited to support these assessments, although sourced with seven sources with direct and indirect access, did not carry sufficient quality, variety, or corroboration to warrant a higher level of confidence. The FBI considered lowering its confidence in the assessments due to the primary sources, who were one-time contacts with indirect access and who may have been motivated by the perceived possibility of a favorable immigration decision. Ultimately, the core evidence, combined with the additional contextual information, supported the FBI's medium confidence in the assessments. As noted below, additional information collected on this threat could prompt the FBI to refine or change its assessments and would improve the confidence in those judgments.

Key Assumption

(U) The assessments in this intelligence assessment rely on the key assumption TdA and its members accommodate willingly the regime's directives when the action either furthers, or at least does not impair, TdA's own interests. If this assumption were incorrect, the regime might threaten Venezuela-based family of TdA members to coerce compliance. If this were happening, the FBI would expect to see new source reporting, subject interviews, and information from LE in both the United States and South America indicating TdA members were seeking LE assistance to protect their families from Venezuelan Government retribution.

Changes or Consistency in Analytic Line

The assessments in this intelligence assessment are consistent with the assessments in three products published since March 2024 but present a detailed analysis of how Venezuelan Government officials likely use TdA in South America and, more recently, the United States to advance the Maduro regime's policy objectives.

Finally, these assessments are also consistent with the assessment conveyed in an 8 March 2024 FBI Situational Awareness Bulletin, but focuses on the Venezuelan Government's role in facilitating the migration of TdA members from Venezuela to the United States to advance Maduro regime objectives.

Analysis of Alternatives

The FBI considered the alternative hypothesis TdA's expansion into the United States and other countries in South and Central America likely is not actively planned or centrally supported by the Venezuelan Government but rather is resulting solely from TdA's organic exploitation of the massive migration of Venezuelans for financial gains. If this alternative proves to be correct, violence and criminal activities, including kidnapping, homicide, sex trafficking, extortion, and drug and weapons trafficking, in North, Central, and South America, the Caribbean, and the United States may increase and strain LE resources to counter TdA in US communities and prisons. Regionally, financially motivated criminal activities and associated violence may cause instability with allied countries in South and Central America, negatively impacting US interests in the region. Supporting this alternate hypothesis, TdA takes advantage of the massive migration of Venezuelan citizens throughout the Western Hemisphere to assume control of these routes and exploit those migrants by engaging in human trafficking, smuggling, extortion, and robbery.¹² This is a major source of income for TdA. Furthermore, TdA members use the migrant groups to reach cities in other countries with a Venezuelan diaspora, which provides cover for them to continue their criminal activity and avoid LE detection.

The FBI considered this alternative hypothesis to be more or less equally plausible with this product's analytic line. Based on the body of the credible open source reporting, some of which cite foreign police officials and prosecutors describing the involvement of TdA members carrying out apparent transnational repression activities allegedly at the behest of the Venezuelan Government, combined with the added contextual information, the FBI deemed the primary assessment to be more likely.

Indicators that would increase the likelihood of this alternative include reporting regarding Venezuelan Government plans and intentions and TdA interests and alignment.

Appendix A: Diplomatic Efforts of the Maduro Regime Tied to Migration and Sanctions Relief

Below is a timeline of diplomatic events beginning with the signing of the Barbados Accords.^j The war in Ukraine has caused increased volatility in the global oil and gas market, driving up oil and gas prices, with mixed implications for Venezuela. While higher prices offered potential revenue gains for oil producing nations, Venezuela's ability to capitalize on these increases has been constrained by ongoing US economic sanctions.

The timeline is drawn from press releases issued by the US Department of State (DOS), sanctions implementation guidance issued by the US Department of the Treasury, and open source media reports. This timeline is not intended to represent a full and nuanced analysis of US-Venezuelan diplomatic exchanges on this topic or a fulsome analysis of Venezuela's foreign and energy policies but is provided to contextualize and partially corroborate, albeit circumstantially, the November 2023 reporting as described above.

Timeline of Diplomatic Events

- **17 October 2023** – Venezuela signed the Barbados Accords as a political roadmap agreement with key electoral guarantees in the run-up to Venezuela's 2024 presidential election.^k
- **18 October 2023** – The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) temporarily suspended sanctions targeting Venezuela's oil, gas, and gold mining sectors.^l
 - OFAC issued General License 43, which temporarily authorized all transactions involving CVG Compania General de Mineria de Venezuela CA (MINERVEN). MINERVEN was the only entity designated by OFAC for operating in the gold sector of the Venezuelan economy.
 - OFAC issued General License 44, which temporarily authorized all transactions related to oil and gas sector operations in Venezuela.

^j The Barbados Accords, formally known as the Partial Agreement on the Promotion of Political Rights and Electoral Guarantees for All, was signed in October 2023 between the Venezuelan Government and the opposition coalition, the Unitary Platform. The agreement aimed to lay the groundwork for free and fair elections in Venezuela, with Norway acting as the main mediator. Source: News article | Associated Press | "Venezuela and opposition reach deal on electoral conditions. They plan to sign Tuesday in Barbados" | 16 October 2023 | <https://apnews.com/article/venezuela-opposition-norway-talks-c7591a133328d66512854a6869b13703> | accessed on 22 October 2024.

^k News article | Reuters | "Venezuela, opposition sign election deal; US weighs sanctions relief" | 17 October 2023 | <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-opposition-sign-election-deal-paving-way-us-sanctions-relief-2023-10-17/> | accessed on 12 May 2025.

^l USG website | US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control | "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Suspension of Certain U.S. Sanctions with Respect to Venezuela on October 18, 2023" | 18 October 2023 | <https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/venezuela-related-sanctions> | accessed on 21 June 2024.

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- **18 October 2023** – Venezuela resumed accepting repatriation flights from the United States immediately after signing the Barbados Accords.^m
 - **30 January 2024** – The Biden Administration announced its intention to re-impose previously suspended oil, gas, and gold mining sanctions targeting Venezuela on 17 April 2024, in response to the Maduro regime's arrest of members of Venezuela's democratic opposition in contravention of the Barbados Accords.ⁿ
 - **30 January 2024** – Rodriguez warned Venezuela would cancel repatriation flights as of 13 February 2024 if the United States were to intensify its "economic aggression against Venezuela," referring to the Biden Administration's decision to re-impose oil and gas sanctions.^o
 - **7 February 2024** – Venezuelan officials disrupt repatriation flights by stopping their validation of the citizenship status of potential returnees.^p
 - **23 February 2024** – Venezuela stopped accepting repatriation flights. The move was not a formal end to the October 2023 agreement; rather, Venezuelan officials blocked the flights by refusing to validate the citizenship of returnees.^q
 - **17 April 2024** – The United States re-imposes oil and gas sanctions on Venezuela.^r

^m Website | International Crisis Group | Barbados Deal Sets Venezuela on a Rocky Path to Competitive Polls | 30 January 2024 | <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/venezuela-the-perilous-path-to-a-key-election> | accessed on 12 May 2025. The International Crisis Group is a global non-profit, non-governmental organization used by policymakers and academics, conducting research and analysis on global crises.

ⁿ Press release | DOS | "Venezuela: Sanctions Actions and Supporting Democracy" | 30 January 2024 | <https://www.state.gov/venezuela-sanctions-actions-and-supporting-democracy/> | accessed on 24 June 2024.

^o News article | Al-Jazeera | "Venezuela accuses US of 'blackmail' over sanctions" | 30 January 2024 | <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/1/30/venezuela-accuses-us-of-blackmail-over-sanctions> | accessed on 24 June 2024 | Al Jazeera operates under Al Jazeera Media Network, which is partially funded by the government of Qatar.

^p News article | *The New York Times* | "Deportation Flights From the U.S. to Venezuela in Limbo" | 7 February 2024 | <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/07/world/americas/migrant-crisis-deport-venezuela-flights.html> | accessed on 21 June 2024.

^q News article | *The New York Post* | "Venezuela stops accepting flights of migrants deported from US, Mexico" | 23 February 2024 | <https://nypost.com/2024/02/23/world-news/venezuela-stops-taking-flights-of-migrants-deported-from-us/> | accessed on 21 June 2024.


^r USG website | US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control | "Frequently Asked Questions Regarding the Suspension of Certain U.S. Sanctions with Respect to Venezuela on October 18, 2023, Updated 17 April 2024" | 17 April 2024 | <https://ofac.treasury.gov/sanctions-programs-and-country-information/venezuela-related-sanctions> | accessed on 21 June 2024.

Appendix B: Venezuelan Migration Trends

The following charts highlight the total number of Venezuelan nationals who, as of December 2022, have left the country since 2015 and the anticipated total through 2025. Chart A was obtained from an open source report focused on Venezuelan migrants and is intended to provide additional context regarding the exodus of Venezuelans under the Maduro regime, as compared to other countries.

Chart A: Historic Venezuelan Migrant Exodus from Venezuela

(millions of migrants)




More than 7 million Venezuelans have left the country since 2015, with 1.4 million more expected to migrate by 2025.

Source: Report | International Monetary Fund | “Venezuela’s Migrants Bring Economic Opportunity to Latin America” | 7 December 2022 | <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2022/12/06/cf-venezuelas-migrants-bring-economic-opportunity-to-latin-america> | accessed on 6 September 2024.

Chart B highlights the increase in Venezuelan citizens who have been encountered by the CBP at and between US ports of entry between October 2019 and July 2024.

Chart B: Citizens of Venezuela: CBP Encounters at and Between Ports of Entry



Source: Report | Advocacy for Human Rights in the Americas | "Citizens of Venezuela: CBP Encounters At and Between Ports of Entry" | 26 August 2024 | <https://borderoversight.org/2024/08/26/cbp-encounters-with-citizens-of-venezuela/> | accessed on 6 September 2024 | The Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) is a US non-governmental organization (NGO) whose stated goal is to promote human rights, democracy, and social and economic justice in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Estimative Language

Analytic products must indicate and explain the basis for the uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments, accomplished through the use of estimative language. Estimative language consists of two elements: (1) A likelihood statement assessing the development of a threat (2) Level of confidence in the sources and the analytic reasoning supporting the judgment.

Assessments/Judgments are not intended to imply statements of fact. They are based on collected information, which is often incomplete or fragmentary, as well as logic, argumentation, and precedents.

Expressions of Likelihood

[IC Directive 203](#), issued on 2 January 2015, states products meeting ODNI analytic standards must express and explain uncertainties associated with analytic judgments. This standard is met in part by expressing likelihood in an analytic judgment.

Phrases such as “the FBI judges” and “the FBI assesses,” and terms such as “likely” and “probably” convey analytical judgments and assessments. The chart below approximates how expressions of likelihood and probability correlate with percentages of chance. Only terms of likelihood should appear in FBI products; the chart includes terms of probability strictly for comparison, as they sometimes appear in reporting from other government agencies. Furthermore, the FBI does not arrive at judgments through statistical analysis and will not use terms of probability to convey uncertainty in FBI external intelligence products.

Terms of Likelihood	Almost No Chance	Very Unlikely	Unlikely	Roughly Even Chance	Likely	Very Likely	Almost Certain(ly)
Terms of Probability	Remote	Highly Improbable	Improbable (Improbably)	Roughly Even Odds	Probable (Probably)	Highly Probable	Nearly Certain
Percentages of Chance	1-5%	5-20%	20-45%	45-55%	55-80%	80-95%	95-99%

Table showing terms of likelihood aligned with terms of probability and percentages of chance.

Confidence Level Definitions

(U) Confidence levels reflect the quality and quantity of the source information supporting a judgment. Consequently, the FBI ascribes high, medium, or low levels of confidence to assessments, as follows:

High confidence generally indicates the FBI's judgments are based on high-quality information from multiple sources. High confidence in a judgment does not imply the assessment is a fact or a certainty; such judgments might be wrong. While additional reporting and information sources may change analytical judgments, such changes are most likely to be refinements and not substantial in nature.

Medium confidence generally means the information is credibly sourced and plausible but not of sufficient quality or corroborated sufficiently to warrant a higher level of confidence. Additional reporting or information sources have the potential to increase the FBI's confidence levels or substantively change analytical judgments.

Low confidence generally means the information's credibility or plausibility is uncertain, the information is too fragmented or poorly corroborated to make solid analytic inferences, or the reliability of the sources is questionable. Absent additional reporting or information sources, analytical judgments should be considered preliminary in nature.

Endnotes

¹ (U) FBI INFORMATION | 24 January 2024 | November 2023 | “[TITLE REDACTED].”

² (U) FBI INFORMATION | 24 April 2024 | February 2024 | “[TITLE REDACTED].”

³ (U) FBI INFORMATION | 24 May 2024 | February 2023 | “[TITLE REDACTED].”

⁴ (U) FBI INFORMATION | 23 August 2023 | 16 August 2023 | “[TITLE REDACTED].”

⁵ (U) Report | European Union Agency for Asylum | “Venezuela – Country Focus” | November 2023 | <https://euaa.europa.eu/publications/venezuela-country-focus> | accessed on 24 April 2024 | EUAA is an agency created by European Union regulation 439/210 to increase cooperation among member states on asylum.

⁶ (U) News article | Al Jazeera | “Venezuela: Who are the colectivos?” | 9 May 2019 | <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2019/5/9/venezuela-who-are-the-colectivos> | accessed on 24 April 2024.

⁷ (U) News article | *The Washington Post* | “Maduro’s muscle: Politically backed motorcycle gangs known as ‘colectivos’ are the enforcers for Venezuela’s authoritarian leader” | 14 March 2019 | https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/maduros-muscle-politically-backed-motorcycle-gangs-known-as-colectivos-are-the-enforcers-for-venezuelas-authoritarian-leader/2019/03/13/2242068c-4452-11e9-94ab-d2dda3c0df52_story.html | accessed on 1 July 2024.

⁸ (U) News article | Al Jazeera | “Chile calls for the extradition of Venezuelans after dissident’s murder” | 12 April 2024 | <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/12/chile-calls-for-the-extradition-of-venezuelans-after-dissidents-murder> | accessed on 24 April 2024.

⁹ (U) News Broadcast | Bogota Caracol Television in Spanish | “Venezuelan ‘Spies,’ Transnational ‘Criminal Gang’ Members Attack Exiled Maduro Opponents Living in Colombia, Chile” | 31 March 2024 | [URL unavailable] | accessed on 3 May 2024 | Caracol Television is a member of the Latin American Information Alliance, the Ibero-American Telecommunications Organization (OTI), the Consortium of National Private Channels and Asomedios.

¹⁰ (U) News article | *El País* | “Fear, Sadness, and Suspicion: the funeral of Ronald Ojeda, the former Venezuelan military officer killed in Chile by Tren de Aragua” | 8 March 2024 | <http://elpais.com/chile/2024-03-09/miedo-tristeza-y-sospechas-el-funeral-de-ronald-ojeda--el-exmilitar-venezolano-asesinado-en-chile-por-el-tren-de-aragua.html> | accessed on 11 July 2024 | El País is a widely distributed Spanish newspaper.

¹¹ (U) News article | *Wall Street Journal* | “Maduro Allies Hunt Dissidents Abroad Ahead of Venezuela’s Election” | 24 July 2024 | <https://www.wsj.com/world/americas/venezuela-maduro-elections-f6baa913> | accessed on 12 November 2024.

¹² (U) Website | InSight Crime | “Tren de Aragua” | 12 July 2024 | <https://insightcrime.org/venezuela-organized-crime-news/tren-de-aragua/> | accessed on 5 October 2024.